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St. James Village, Inc. v. Cunningham, 125 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 21 (June 25, 
2009) (en banc)1 
 
PROPERTY LAW – EASEMENTS 
 
Summary 
 
 Appeal from a district court’s order denying declaratory relief to a servient estate owner 
seeking authorization to unilaterally relocate an easement across its property. 
    
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 Despite holding the standard for relocating an easement announced in Swenson v. Stout 
Realty, Inc.2 is overbroad and thus adopting the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 
4.8 (2000) the Court affirmed denial of declaratory relief because even under the newly adopted 
standard, the facts of this case did not qualify for unilateral relocation of the easement.  
 
Factual and Procedural History  
 
 Respondents Jennifer A. Cunningham, Craig Cunningham, James H. Saladin, and 
Thelma L. Saladin (hereinafter “the Cunninghams”) own land adjacent to 1,600 acres owned by 
Appellant St. James Village, Inc. (hereinafter “St. James”).  In 1974, the Cunninghams’ 
predecessors in interest purchased an express easement over the land now owned by St. James to 
provide access to their adjacent property from a public road.  The easement’s deed provides a 
metes and bounds description of the easement’s specific location.  The deed does not, however, 
discuss any procedures or rights to relocate the easement.  The Cunninghams’ predecessors 
recorded the easement deed in 1974 and the conveyance to the Cunninghams, which includes the 
metes and bounds description, was recorded in 1997. 
 St. James acquired the servient property and designed a master-planned gated 
community.  The current easement crosses 14 lots in the planned development.  St. James sought 
to curve the existing easement to allow development of the encumbered lots.  St. James 
contacted the Cunninghams to gain their consent to the relocation but the Cunninghams refused.  
 Subsequently, St. James filed a declaratory action arguing that Nevada law governing 
relocation of easements is unsettled and thus the Court should adopt Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes § 4.8 (hereinafter “Section 4.8”), which allows unilateral relocation under 
some circumstances.  The Cunninghams moved to dismiss arguing that the Swenson standard, 
requiring the other party’s consent before one party can relocate an easement, is controlling.  The 
district court found that Swenson was controlling law in Nevada and denied St. James’ requested 
relief. 3  St. James appealed. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 By Ian Houston 
2 452 P.2d 972, 974 (Nev. 1969). 
3 On appeal, the Court treated the district court’s order as one resolving a request for declaratory relief. 
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Discussion 
 
Swenson is controlling 
 
A statement is dictum when it is “unnecessary to a determination of the question 
involved.”4  In Swenson, the court held that the Swensons could not rely on their broker’s 
statement that an easement across the land they purchased could be relocated.5  The Court 
appeared to consider 1) whether the broker’s statement was false, and 2) whether the Swensons’ 
reliance on the statement was unreasonable.6   
Prior to examining the reliance issue, the Swenson court determined the broker’s 
statement was legally false and stated, “It is a general rule of law that, in the absence of [a] 
statute to the contrary, the location of an easement once selected, cannot be changed by either the 
landowner or the easement owner without the other’s consent.”7   
The Court in the instant case held Swenson was controlling because the Swenson court 
made a determination that the broker’s statement was false before determining whether the 
Swensons’ reliance on the statement was unreasonable.  Because the Swenson court’s holding 
that the broker’s statement was false necessitated a determination of whether an easement could 
be relocated unilaterally, the standard is controlling. 
 
Swenson is overbroad, thus Court adopted Section 4.8 for unilateral easement relocation cases 
 
Despite determining that Swenson was controlling, the Court held a standard requiring 
both parties’ consent to relocate an easement in all circumstances is overbroad.  The Court 
instead adopted the more flexible Section 4.8 standard.  Section 4.8 states:   
 
Except where the location and dimensions are determined by the instrument or 
circumstances surrounding creation of a servitude, they are determined as follows: 
(1) The owner of the servient estate has the right within a reasonable time to 
specify a location that is reasonably suited to carry out the purpose of the 
servitude. 
(2) The dimensions are those reasonably necessary for enjoyment of the 
servitude. 
(3) Unless expressly denied by the terms of an easement, as defined in §1.2, 
the owner of the servient estate is entitled to make reasonable changes in the 
location or dimensions of an easement, at the servient owner’s expense, to permit 
normal use or development of the servient estate, but only if the changes do not 
(a) significantly lessen the utility of the easement, 
(b) increase the burdens on the owner of the easement in its use and 
enjoyment, or 
(c) frustrate the purpose for which the easement was created. 
                                                 
4 Stanley v. Levy & Zentner Co., 112 P.2d 1047, 1054 (Nev. 1941). 
5 Swenson, 452 P.2d at 974 (broker sued the Swensons for commission on the sale of their property and the 
Swensons countersued for damages resulting from broker’s legally incorrect statement regarding relocation of an 
easement in an unrelated transaction). 
6 Id. at 974. 
7 Id. at 974.  
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The Court weighed Section 4.8’s purpose, to “permit development of the servient 
estate to the extent it can be accomplished without unduly interfering with the legitimate 
interests of the easement holder”8 against concerns of increased litigation over the 
reasonableness of the servient estate holder’s proposed relocation, the creation of 
uncertainty in the property rights of dominant estate owners and the risk that dominant 
estate owners would lose the benefit of their bargains.   
Ultimately, the Court determined that under the appropriate circumstances, the public 
policy furthered by Section 4.8 outweighs the risk of increased litigation and Section 4.8’s 
reasonableness requirements guarantee the rights of dominant estate owners will not be 
undermined.  As such, dominant estate owners will not lose the benefit of their bargains. 
 
Even under Section 4.8, St. James is not entitled to relief 
  
The Cunninghams argued that the introductory language of Section 4.8 excepted their 
easement from susceptibility to unilateral relocation because the deed contains a metes and 
bounds description of the easement.  The Court agreed, holding that the language prefacing 
Section 4.8 unambiguously states that its provisions apply, “[e]xcept where the location and 
dimensions [of the easement] are determined by the instrument or circumstances surrounding 
creation of a servitude.”9  In so holding, the Court rejected St. James’ argument that such an 
interpretation would render language in Subsection 4.8(3) a nullity.  The Court reasoned that 
Subsection 4.8(3) has no bearing on the introductory language but instead is an additional 
limitation to Section 4.8’s applicability.  
Accordingly, the Court concluded that because the deed contained an express metes and 
bounds description of the easement, the provisions of Section 4.8 do not apply and St. James is 
not authorized to relocate the easement without the Cunninghams’ consent.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Court concluded that because the Swenson Court’s holding necessitated a determination 
of whether an easement could be relocated unilaterally, Swenson is controlling, and not dictum.  
However, the Court further held the Swenson standard is overbroad because it requires, in all 
circumstances, that both parties consent to the easement relocation.  Thus, the Court adopted the 
more flexible Restatement (Third) of Torts: Servitudes § 4.8 for deciding unilateral easement 
relocation cases.  Based on a plain reading of the introductory language to Section 4.8, the Court 
concluded that Section 4.8’s provisions allowing unilateral easement relocation do not apply 
when the creating instrument defines the easement through specific reference to its location or 
dimensions.  The easement deed in this case contained an express metes and bounds description 
and as such the Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of St. James’ complaint.10 
                                                 
8 Section 4.8 cmt. f (2000) (benefits of allowing some flexibility include: 1) increasing the value of the servient 
estate without diminishing the value of the dominant estate; 2) encouraging the use of easements; 3) lowering the 
price of easements by reducing the risk that the servient estate will be unduly restricted from developing the estate in 
the future; and 3) providing a fair trade-off to the servient estate for its vulnerability to increased use of the easement 
with technological advances and development of the dominant estate).   
9 Section 4.8. 
10 The Court acknowledged that the district court dismissed St. James’ complaint based on the overbroad Swenson 
standard but cited Hotel Riviera, Inc. v. Torres, 632 P.2d 1155, 1158 (1981) as holding that, “[i]f a decision below is 
correct, it will not be disturbed on appeal even though the lower court relied upon wrong reasons.”   
